This paper embeds a long-term financial contract subject to asymmetric information into an industry equilibrium model to explore the quantitative implications of endogenous financing constraints for job reallocation. In the model, firms sign upon entry long-term contracts with banks that finance their entry and per period labor costs. Firms may exit due to liquidation by banks or exogenous exit shocks. The model has a unique stationary equilibrium with turnover of jobs and firms. A quantitative exercise shows that endogenous financing constraints account for a significant amount of job reallocation observed in U.S. manufacturing and the observed negative relationship between gross job flow rates and firm size as measured by employment.
Introduction
This paper explores the quantitative implications of financial frictions for simultaneous expansion and contraction across firms and the consequent reallocation of employment. The quantitative significance of reallocation is reflected in the high turnover rates of jobs and firms. Davis, Haltiwanger and Schuh (1996) document that on average 10.3 percent of manufacturing jobs were destroyed and 9.1 percent were created per annum during the 1973-88 period. And during the same period, according to the Census of Manufactures, over forty percent of manufacturing firms disappeared over a five-year period and were replaced by new ones. Empirical studies, such as Evans (1987) , Hall (1987) , Dunne et al. (1989) , and Davis et al. (1996) , also find interesting regularities in the turnover. Notably, firm exit rates, job creation, destruction and reallocation rates are decreasing in firm size (measured by employment) and age.
Existing labor market theories, including labor demand models with adjustment costs of labor and search theories of equilibrium job flows, have difficulty in accounting for the negative size and age dependence of gross employment flows. Recent development in the theory of firm dynamics and industry evolution has shown promise in resolving this problem. The learning theory of Jovanovic (1982) has the potential to account for the negative age dependence of turnover. Hopenhayn (1992) , modeling the entry, exit and size dynamics of firms as driven by persistent idiosyncratic technology shocks, can explain the negative dependence of firm exit rates on firm size. However, as pointed out by Cooley and Quadrini (2001) , without some restrictions on the transition probabilities of the shock process, it is hard to derive a general pattern of job reallocation by firm size. This paper studies firm dynamics from another angle: frictions in firm financing and the resultant financing constraints. There is considerable empirical evidence suggesting that financing constraints might be important determinants of firm dynamics.
1 Recent work by Cooley and Quadrini (2001) , Albuquerque and Hopenhayn (2004) , Quadrini (2004) and Clementi and Hopenhayn (2006) shows that models of firm dynamics that incorporate exogenous or endogenous financing constraints are qualitatively consistent with the stylized facts of firm growth and survival documented in the empirical studies. In particular, Clementi and Hopenhayn (2006) (hereafter C-H) model financing constraints as part of the optimal design of a long-term lending contract under asymmetric information between a firm and a bank and show that the optimal contract implies interesting firm dynamics that exhibit negative size and age dependence: on average smaller and younger firms are more financially constrained, grow faster, but have higher probability of being liq-uidated. This paper follows this line of research, but aims to quantitatively evaluate the significance of financing constraints for job reallocation which has not been addressed in the literature so far. Specifically, this study embeds the C-H type contract into an industry equilibrium model to address two quantitative questions. First, how much job reallocation can be accounted for by endogenous financing constraints? And second, how much of the negative size and age dependence of job reallocation can be accounted for by endogenous financing constraints?
In the model, firms are endowed with identical risky projects that require a fixed initial investment that firms cannot afford with their initial wealth and perperiod labor inputs to produce a homogeneous product in every period. Production is subject to idiosyncratic production shocks which are i.i.d. across firms and over time. Firms have private information about the outcomes of their production. Upon entry, a new firm signs a long-term financial contract, essentially a C-H contract, with a competitive bank. This finances its initial investment and wage bills in every period. The firm can be liquidated by the bank and exit the industry at the beginning of a period.
An important feature of the C-H contract, however, needs to be amended to avoid degeneracy in a stationary industry equilibrium. That is, the contract implies two absorbing states for a firm: either the firm is liquidated and exits or it grows to the unconstrained efficient size such that borrowing constraints cease forever and the firm will never be liquidated. As a result, in a stationary industry equilibrium all incumbent firms would attain the same efficient size so that there would be no firm entry, exit, or job reallocation. In the benchmark model stochastic exogenous firm exit is introduced to avoid degeneracy. Exogenous firm exit also serves to capture firm exits in the data due to forces other than the financial friction modeled here. The model is shown to possess a unique stationary competitive equilibrium with entry and exit so that the quantitative questions outlined earlier can be addressed.
The model is then calibrated and simulated to conduct a quantitative analysis. The baseline calibration picks key parameters to match five moments of the U.S. manufacturing data: mean annual firm exit rate, employment shares of new firms and exiting firms, and relative sizes of new and exiting firms. The calibrated model generates an annual job reallocation rate of 7.64 percent, while a symmetric information version of the model implies an annual job reallocation rate of 2 .86 percent. So the financial friction leads to a job reallocation rate of 4.78 percent per year, about 25 percent of the job reallocation rate documented in the data. Job creation, job destruction, and job reallocation rates are found to exhibit a clear negative relationship with firm size. In particular, the correlation coefficient of job reallocation rate and average firm size is −0.4, about 70 percent of the correlation in the data. These results suggest that job reallocations due to financial frictions are quantitatively significant and exhibit a negative size dependence close to that observed in the data. The model also generates a strong negative size dependence of firm exit rates, consistent with the empirical findings. An unconditional negative age dependence of firm exits and gross job flows is also found, but it stems from the negative size dependence: once controlled for firm size, age dependence disappears. The model does not find a clear relationship between net growth rates and firm size. However, conditional on survival firm growth rates and the variability of firm growth decrease with firm size, which is consistent with early empirical studies that investigate the relationship between firm growth and size conditional on survival.
Li (2009) discusses another two ways to amend the C-H contract to change its long-run implications so that borrowing constraints as well as firm growth and exit exist in the long run. One way assumes that the entrepreneur has a lower discount factor than the bank, and the other assumes that the bank has limited commitment. If firms are financed by either of the modified contracts characterized in Li (2009) , a stationary industry equilibrium with entry and exit results without introducing exogenous firm exit. So for a robustness check, we also calibrate two alternative models in which firms are financed by the two modified contracts, respectively. Both models do not assume exogenous firm exit and hence the growth and failure of firms are fully driven by the endogenous financing constraints implied by the optimal lending contracts. The two models differ from the benchmark model only in one parameter. They are calibrated to match the same five moments, and the calibrations yield similar values for common parameters as the benchmark calibration. The two models give similar results regarding the two quantitative questions we aim to address, though notable differences are found in their implications for firm size distribution. Both models predict an annual job reallocation rate of about 20 percent and a correlation of job reallocation rate with average firm size of about -0.5, while symmetric information versions of both models have no firm exit or job reallocation at all. Compared with the benchmark model, job reallocations in both models are more quantitatively significant and exhibit a stronger negative size dependence. On the one hand, since firm exit is fully driven by financing constraints in both models, calibrating them to match the observed firm exit rate may over-estimate the contributions of financial frictions to job reallocation. 2 On the other hand, since limited commitment of banks represents another form of financial frictions, the combination of two financial frictions is expected to result in a job reallocation that is more quantitatively significant than that implied by asymmetric information alone. These results again confirm the quantitative significance of job reallocation due to financial frictions and the important role of financial frictions in accounting for the observed negative size dependence of job reallocation.
This study belongs to an emerging literature that embeds long-term lending contracts into industry or general equilibrium settings to study the quantitative implications of endogenous financing constraints for industry dynamics or the aggregate economy. Representative work includes Cooley et al. (2004) and Smith and Wang (2006) . The former incorporates an optimal financial contract with limited contract enforceability into a general equilibrium model to quantify its consequences for macroeconomic volatility while the latter incorporates a lending contract with private information into a general equilibrium model to quantify its impact on the level of aggregate economic activity.
The rest of the paper is arranged as follows. Section 2 describes the environment of the model. Section 3 defines and characterizes the stationary competitive industry equilibrium. Section 4 describes the calibration and the results from a quantitative analysis. Section 5 briefly describes quantitative results from calibrating two alternative models, and Section 6 provides some final remarks.
The Benchmark Model
Time is discrete and lasts forever. In every period, a continuum of entrepreneurs are born and each of them is assumed to face a time-invariant exogenous probability 1−η of surviving into next period. Each entrepreneur is endowed with net worth M and a risky project, which requires an initial fixed investment I > M and per-period labor input to produce a homogeneous product. The labor costs must be paid before production. Once in operation, a project is subject to idiosyncratic production shocks θ t in every period, where θ t ∈ {H, L} with prob{θ = H} = π. If θ t = H, the project produces output f (l t ), where l t is the number of workers employed in period t, and the function f is assumed to be continuous, strictly increasing, strictly concave and continuously differentiable. If θ t = L, output in period t is zero. Production shocks are independent across projects and over time. The realizations of production shocks are assumed to be private information of the entrepreneur who manages the project. Outsiders cannot observe or verify it.
Since I > M, an entrepreneur needs the financial services of a bank to undertake her project. As discussed in C-H, the presence of asymmetric information gives rise to a long-term credit relationship between an entrepreneur and a bank, under which the bank provides funds for the entrepreneur to finance the initial investment and per-period labor cost of the project in exchange for repayments from the entrepreneur. Entrepreneurs are assumed to have limited liability, that is, they are liable for repayments only to the extent of current revenues in every period. The remaining revenues are fully consumed by entrepreneurs. At the beginning of every period, a project can be liquidated either because the entrepreneur who manages it dies or the bank chooses to liquidate it. A liquidated project yields a positive scrap value S. It is assumed that S < I − M.
Banks are competitive, infinitely-lived, and have access to a large pool of funds. At the beginning of every period newborn entrepreneurs are offered longterm contracts by banks. If an entrepreneur accepts a contract, her project gets financed and a new firm is created in the industry. From then on, the firm simply follows the contract for its labor, repayment and dividend decisions. If the firm is liquidated by the bank, the entrepreneur exits the industry and never re-enters. If the entrepreneur dies, the firm is also liquidated and the bank she signs the contract with acquires the scrap value. An entrepreneur who does not accept any contract stays out of the industry and simply consumes her initial wealth. Throughout the discussion, banks are summarized into a single agent who contracts with all entrepreneurs.
Incumbent firms behave competitively, taking prices in output ( p) and labor (w) markets as given. Aggregate demand for the product is given by the inverse demand function, p = D(Q), where the function D is continuous, strictly decreasing, and satisfies lim Q→∞ D(Q) = 0 and 0 < lim Q→0 D(Q) < ∞. The wage rate is normalized to 1, i.e., w = 1. Both entrepreneurs and banks are risk neutral, and discount future cash flows at the same discount rate β .
The timing of events in one period is summarized as follows. At the beginning of a period, some entrepreneurs die, their firms are scrapped and they exit the industry (exogenous firm exit). Some of the incumbent firms are then liquidated by banks, also exiting the industry (endogenous firm exit). At the same time, some newborn entrepreneurs sign contracts with banks and create new firms. All existing firms then hire labor from the competitive labor market and pay wage bills with funds from banks. Production is then undertaken with production shocks realized for every firm. Entrepreneurs sell their output in the product market, and make reports about production outcomes to banks. Conditional on the reports, revenues are divided between banks and entrepreneurs.
Equilibrium
A stationary industry equilibrium is considered. Since there is no aggregate uncertainty, the output price p is a constant in a stationary equilibrium. To see how the presence of asymmetric information affects the dynamics of a firm and the industry, we first characterize the equilibrium under the case of symmetric information, where banks also observe the production shocks of firms. Then we formulate the optimal financial contract between the bank and an entrepreneur, and discuss the entry problem of a new firm and the evolution of the industry. Finally, we define the stationary competitive industry equilibrium and analyze its existence and uniqueness.
Symmetric Information Equilibrium
Since all entrepreneurs are identical at birth, the bank offers them the same optimal lifetime contract in equilibrium. With symmetric information, the optimal contract achieves the first-best outcome, i.e., the bank provides an entrepreneur with funds to employ the unconstrained efficient amount of labor in every period, which is given by l
Then the total value of the contract, defined as the total expected discounted value of future net cash flows delivered from the project, is given by
This is divided between the bank and the entrepreneur. Denote the value of the contract to the entrepreneur (the entrepreneur's claim to future cash flows) by V . Following C-H, V is also called the firm's equity value throughout the discussion. Then
where τ is the entrepreneur's repayment to the bank in a period if her production is successful (due to limited liability, the entrepreneur does not need to pay anything if her project fails in that period). The value of the contract to the bank is then given by
Free entry of firms implies that the value of the contract to the entrepreneur is equal to her initial wealth:
And competition among banks implies that the value of the contract to the bank is equal to the initial investment cost of the project that has to be financed by the bank:
Eq. (4)-(6) imply thatW (p) = I.
Combined with (2), this pins down the equilibrium output price p. Then the repayment τ is determined by (3) and (5). The total output of the industry is given by
and the size of the industry or the total mass of incumbent firms N is determined by
Since S < I − M, the bank never liquidates an incumbent firm, implying that a firm exits only when the entrepreneur who manages the firm dies. So in equilibrium, a fraction η of incumbent firms exit the industry and the same number of new firms enter the industry in every period, such that firms with total mass of N operate at the unconstrained efficient level in every period, hiring the efficient amount of labor and producing the efficient level of output. The job creation rate and job destruction rate are both η, and the job reallocation rate is simply 2η. It's clear that with symmetric information, incumbent firms do not expand or contract and firms exit only exogenously. So there is no job creation and destruction beyond those resulting from exogenous entry and exit of firms.
The Optimal Financial Contract under Asymmetric Information
Again since entrepreneurs are ex-ante identical, in equilibrium the bank offers them the same optimal financial contract. The contracting problem here is exactly the same as studied in C-H except that the entrepreneur is now subject to exogenous stochastic death. The uncertain survival, however, does not change the qualitative properties of the contract. So we'll simply re-formulate the optimal contract in the current context and summarize its main features, while referring all technical derivations to C-H. The optimal contract possesses a recursive formulation, taking the entrepreneur's value entitlement (the value of the contract to the entrepreneur), V , as the state variable. Note that V is naturally bounded above byṼ (p) ≡
, the maximum expected discounted cash flow the project could deliver to the entrepreneur. So the state space for V is [0,Ṽ(p)]. For a given V , the bank's problem is to choose the choice variables to maximize B(V ), the value of the contract to herself, or equivalently, to maximize the total value, W (V ) ≡ V + B(V ). At the beginning of a period, conditional on survival of the entrepreneur, the first decision to be made is whether to liquidate the firm, obtaining the scrap value S, or keep it in operation. If the firm is not scrapped, the decision at the continuation stage is to choose the labor input, repayment to the bank, etc.
Taking p as given, a recursive formulation for the liquidation problem is given by
The state variable V is the value entitlement to the entrepreneur conditional on her survival at the beginning of a period. α is the liquidation probability. As argued in C-H, a stochastic liquidation would be optimal due to the non-convexity introduced by a constant scrap value. X is the transfer from the bank to the entrepreneur in case of liquidation (X = 0 in equilibrium). V c is the value entitlement to the entrepreneur contingent on no liquidation of the firm andŴ (V c ; p) is the total value of the contract at the continuation stage. Eq. (8) is a promise-keeping constraint, stating that the contract delivers an expected value equal to V to the entrepreneur such that the bank's promise to the entrepreneur is fulfilled.
A recursive formulation for the continuation problem is given by
First note that the continuation value function here takes into account the possible exogenous exit of the firm. The state variable V denotes the value entitlement to the entrepreneur contingent on continuation of the firm. l is the amount of labor the firm hires with funds from the bank. τ is the repayment to the bank if a high production shock is reported. V H and V L are the value entitlements to the entrepreneur at the beginning of next period contingent on her survival if she reports a high or a low shock respectively. Eq. (9) is the promising-keeping constraint. Eq. (10) is the short version of the incentive compatibility constraint
which ensures that the entrepreneur truthfully reports when a high shock is realized (the entrepreneur cannot misreport when a low shock is realized). Eq. (11) is the limited liability constraint for the entrepreneur.
The assumption of stochastic exogenous firm exit alters the C-H contract in two aspects. First, the actual discount factor becomes β (1 − η), and second, an extra constant term β ηS appears in the objective of (P 2 ). It's clear that both alterations do not affect the qualitative properties of the value functions and the policy functions, as extensively characterized in C-H. The key properties, which are the driving forces underlying the quantitative results to be described later, are summarized in the current context as follows. First, there exists V r (p) ∈ (0,Ṽ (p)) such that for V smaller than V r (p) the liquidation probability α(V ; p) is positive and linearly decreasing with V , and for V higher than V r (p) the bank does not liquidate the firm in current period. Second, the optimal employment l(V ; p) is strictly less than its unconstrained efficient level l * (p) for V <Ṽ (p), and equals l * (p) atṼ (p). That is, the firm is borrowing constrained until its equity value reachesṼ (p). Further, as shown in Figure 1 in Appendix A, employment tends to increase with equity values although monotonicity does not hold throughout the whole range of V . 3 In other words, the endogenous financing constraints tend to relax as the firm's equity value grows. Third, the future value entitlements satisfy
, implying that the firm's equity value increases with a good shock and decreases with a bad shock. However, atṼ (p), both V H and V L equalṼ (p), implying that once the firm's equity value reachesṼ (p), which can be achieved following a finite sequence of good production shocks if the firm is not liquidated by the bank or exits exogenously at an earlier stage, it will never decrease such that financing constraints cease forever and the firm will never be endogenously liquidated.
Nevertheless, the possibility of exogenous firm exit changes the long run dynamics of the industry dramatically. The properties described above imply that the evolution process of equity values has two absorbing states: "Eventually, either the first one is reached and the firm is liquidated, or the second one is reached and borrowing constraints cease forever", as wrote in C-H. So without exogenous exit of firms, over time a diminishing fraction of firms is liquidated and exit the industry while an increasing fraction of incumbent firms reaches the unconstrained stage. Eventually all incumbent firms would reach the unconstrained stage. As a result there would be no firm entry and exit or job creation and destruction in a stationary equilibrium. With stochastic exogenous firm exit, at least a fraction η of incumbent firms exit in every period and new firms enter correspondingly. As will be shown in the subsection below, new firms start with an initial equity value lower thanṼ (p). So although some incumbent firms will grow to the unconstrained efficient size and cease to create or destroy jobs (unless they exit exogenously), there are always younger and smaller firms which haven't reached the unconstrained stage yet and these firms continually create or destroy jobs. The implied long run dynamics of the industry, therefore, is expected to provide an environment in which there are endogenous as well as exogenous turnover of jobs and firms such that the quantitative questions outlined in the Introduction can be addressed.
Entry of New Firms
In every period, newborn entrepreneurs are offered lifetime contracts by banks and may accept whatever contract gives them the highest expected discounted value. In equilibrium they are offered the same contract-the optimal contract characterized above. If an entrepreneur accepts the contract, her project gets financed and a new firm enters the industry. Because of competition among banks, the value entitlement to an entrepreneur upon entry or the initial equity value of a new firm, V 0 , is determined by
here (12) is the participation constraint for the bank, stating that the value of the contract to the bank upon signing the contract is no less than the initial setup cost of the project that has to be financed by the bank.
For a given p, the value of the contract to the bank,B(V ; p), is hump-shaped following the fact thatŴ (V ; p) is concave and strictly increasing on [0,Ṽ(p)]. Since W (0; p) = β S < I − M, it's clear that if I − M is too big, a solution to (P 3 ) does not exist. 4 In this case, the project is not financially feasible. If a solution to
It's obvious that V 0 (p) > 0. Also note that atṼ (p), the value of the contract to the bank is given by
It follows that 0 < V 0 (p) <Ṽ (p). The following lemma establishes the relationship between V 0 (p) and V r (p), and the dependence of V 0 (p) on the output price p. It is to be used in establishing the existence and uniqueness of a stationary equilibrium with entry and exit. Once the initial equity value V 0 (p) is determined, the evolution of a new firm's equity value during its life cycle is completely regulated by the optimal financial contract in relation to its production shock realizations. This in turn determines its employment, repayments, dividends, and the probability of endogenous liquidation in every period.
Evolution of the Industry
As discussed earlier, the state of an incumbent firm is fully described by its equity value at the continuation stage of a period, V (the state variable in (P 2 )). So the state of the industry can be described by the distribution of all incumbent firms over V . The state of the industry can also be described by the distribution of firms over equity values at the beginning of a period conditional on survival of exogenous exit shocks. The former is chosen for simplicity since it is the distribution directly related to aggregate production. Let µ t (V ; p) denote the distribution of incumbent firms over equity values at the continuation stage of period t, and denote the total mass of new entrant firms at the beginning of period t by E t . Then µ satisfies the law of motion
where V (p) is the σ-algebra generated by the state space of V , and χ A (·) is an indicator function, i.e., χ A (V ) equals 1 if V ∈ A and equals 0 otherwise. In equilibrium, the state space for V is given by [V r (p),Ṽ (p)], since the equity value for new entry firms is V 0 (p) > V r (p) and equity values of continuing firms lie in
The transition from µ t to µ t+1 can be written as µ t+1 = T * (µ t , E t+1 ; p). It can be shown that T * is linearly homogeneous in µ and E jointly. That is, if the industry has twice as many firms of each type at the continuation stage of period t, and entry is doubled at the beginning of period t + 1, then the industry will end up with twice as many firms of each type at the continuation stage of period t + 1. This property turns out to be useful in the computation of an invariant distribution. Lemma 2 establishes this result.
Lemma 2 T * is linearly homogeneous in µ and E jointly. PROOF: See Appendix B.
With a measure of firms, total labor demand L D , output Y, repayments to the bank T , dividends Π, and total scrap value of liquidated firms R can be defined respectively.
It follows from Lemma 2 that the aggregate quantities defined above are all linearly homogeneous in µ.3
.5 Stationary Competitive Equilibrium
A stationary competitive equilibrium for the industry consists of an output price p * ≥ 0 and total output Q * ; policy functions α(
a measure of incumbent firms µ * and a mass of entrants E * ≥ 0 such that (i) the value functions and policy functions solve (P 1 ) and (P 2 );
Condition (ii) states that demand must equal supply in the output market. Condition (iii) is the free entry condition for firms. Since there is unlimited supply of potential entrants, V 0 (p * ) cannot be strictly bigger than the initial wealth of an entrepreneur, M. If E * is strictly positive, V 0 (p * ) must equal M to ensure that firms are willing to enter. Then by (13)
This condition pins down p * in a stationary equilibrium with positive entry. It states that the total expected discounted value from undertaking a project equals the initial setup cost of a project, or in short total expected value from entry equals the entry cost. Condition (iv) states that µ * and E * are such that the state of the industry is reproduced in every period through the optimal actions of firms and banks.
Since the data used to calibrate the model in a later section exhibits significant amount of entry and exit, we look for a stationary industry equilibrium that exhibits entry and exit. Note that if I is too big relative to M, an empty industry would result as the unique industry equilibrium. For instance, denote p 0 as the price level corresponding to zero demand, then if I ≥Ŵ (M; p 0 ), µ = 0 constitutes an equilibrium. So to ensure the existence of an equilibrium with entry and exit, we need to impose restrictions on certain parameters. The industry evolution model of Hopenhayn (1992) has the property that if the entry cost is less than a critical value, there exists an equilibrium with entry and exit, and it is the unique stationary equilibrium. A similar property is established in Theorem 1. Intuitively, if M is too small or too large, V 0 (p) would be strictly greater than M or strictly smaller than M for all p at which the entry problem has a solution such that the condition for positive entry cannot be satisfied. Given M < M <M, if the entry cost I is not too big relative to M so that the part of the entry cost needed to be financed by the bank I − M is not too big, undertaking the project would be profitable and a contractual relationship between a firm and the bank would also be feasible. The bank would like to offer contracts and new firms would like to accept them so that there is positive entry of firms in every period. On the other hand, the assumed stochastic death of entrepreneurs, together with endogenous liquidation of firms, lead to positive firm exits in every period. Properties of the optimal financial contract and the assumed possibility of exogenous firm exit ensure that the conditions required for convergence of the firm distribution are satisfied (see the proof in Appendix B). As the industry evolves, a unique invariant firm distribution with entry and exit is resultant.
Quantitative Analysis
In this section, the model laid out above is solved numerically and quantitative implications of the model are examined. The stationary equilibrium has the property that aggregate variables are constant over time while individual firms are continually adjusting over time. At any point in time there are some firms expanding, some firms contracting, some entering while others exiting. Entering and expanding firms hire workers and create jobs, while contracting and exiting firms fire workers and destroy jobs. This provides the setting to address the quantitative questions outlined in the Introduction.
Baseline Calibration
To perform a quantitative analysis, we need to specify functional forms and assign parameter values. The production function is assumed to take the form
where 0 < γ < 1 measures the degree of return to scale, and A is a scale factor. The inverse demand function takes the form
where a is a positive constant. Since we are interested in long run behavior, a period in the model is defined as one year. Following Gomes (2001) and Hennessy and Whited (2005) , the discount factor for firms and banks, β , is set to 1/1.065 to match an average annual real return of roughly 6.5 percent for major U.S. equity indexes such as S&P 500 over the last century. 6 The assignment of remaining parameters requires a value of the stationary equilibrium output price p * . Following Hopenhayn and Rogerson (1993) , p * is normalized to unity and values of remaining parameters are chosen to be consistent with it. The scale factor A is chosen such that the unconstrained efficient level of employment is 1500 workers. 7 The exogenous probability of firm exit η, the return to scale parameter γ, the probability of realizing a good production shock π, the scrap value S, and the initial wealth of an entrepreneur or a new firm's initial equity value M are jointly chosen to match five moments that describe the entry and exit behavior in the U.S. manufacturing data. The idea is to calibrate the model to match as many dimensions of the observed entry and exit dynamics as possible, then compare the model's predictions regarding job creation and destruction with those reported in Davis et al. (1996) . The first moment is the mean annual entry/exit rate of manufacturing firms. According to Dunne, Roberts and Samuelson (1988) , where the Census of Manufactures data are exploited, the entry rate of new manufacturing firms during the period of 1963 to 1982 is about 4.49 percent per year on average, implying a comparable mean annual exit rate. The second and third moments are the mean annual employment shares of new firms and exiting firms respectively. Lack of access to relevant data sets (such as LRD) and empirical studies based on firmlevel data prevents a direct measure of these two moments. Nevertheless, they can be reasonably approximated by the employment shares of new plants and exiting plants, as single-plant firms account for more than ninety percent of total firms in the U.S. manufacturing according to Dunne et al. (1988) . According to the Annual Survey of Manufactures (ASM), the mean annual employment share of start-up plants and shut-down plants are 1.05 percent and 2.17 percent during the period of 1973-88 respectively. 8 The last two moments are the relative sizes of new firms and exiting firms. Dunne et al. (1988) define the relative size of new (exiting) firms as the ratio of average output of new (exiting) firms to the average output of incumbent (non-exiting) firms, and estimate them to be 0.284 and 0.347 on average during the period of 1967 to 1982.
The simulated annealing algorithm, as described in Goffe et al. (1994) , is applied to perform the moment-matching. Here is a brief description of the procedure. For arbitrary values of the five parameters, the contracting problem as specified in (P 1 ) and (P 2 ) is numerically solved by value function iteration (piecewise linear approximation). The entry problem (P 3 ) is then solved to determine a firm's initial equity value V 0 . Letting E = 1, a stationary measure of firms µ is computed by iterating on (14). The equilibrium level of entry E * is determined such that equilibrium labor demand matches the mean annual employment of U.S. manufacturing. Then the equilibrium stationary firm distribution µ * is simply E * µ. The five moments are then calculated using the invariant firm distribution. This procedure is continued until the distance between the model moments and the actual data moments is minimized. In calculating the distance, a higher weight is put on the first
Once M is chosen, we simply set I =Ŵ (M; p * ). Finally, the scale parameter a in the inverse demand function is set such that the total employment in the stationary equilibrium equals the mean annual employment of U.S. manufacturing during the 1972-88 period, 18.135 million employees according to ASM. Table 1 summarizes the baseline parameter values and matched quantities. The high degree of nonlinearities in the solution makes it hard to match all moments exactly. Nevertheless the matching appears reasonably well, with the only exception that the model overestimates the relative size of exiting firms. The estimated parameter values also seem reasonable. In particular, the exogenous probability of firm exit η is estimated to be 1.43 percent, much lower than the total exit rate of firms, suggesting that there is substantial endogenous firm turnover due to the financing constraints. The estimated value of α is not much lower than 1, suggesting that the technology does not substantially depart from constant return to scale. This is consistent with the finding in many studies of the manufacturing sector, such as Burnside (1996) and Basu and Fernald (1997) . The probability of realizing a good production shock π is estimated to be about 60 percent. The estimates of S, M and I satisfy the assumption S < I − M.
The stationary firm distribution over employment, derived from the stationary distribution over equity values, is illustrated by a histogram in Figure 2 of Appendix A.
Quantitative Significance of Financing Constraints
From the discussions in Section 3, it's clear that the endogenous financing constraints due to asymmetric information lead to endogenous job reallocation beyond those resulting from exogenous firm entry and exit. Now with parameter values determined and the equilibrium approximated numerically, the quantitative significance of such endogenous job reallocation can be evaluated. We do so by comparing the equilibrium outcome with the symmetric information equilibrium. The latter is obtained following the descriptions of Section 3.1, taking as given all parameter values in Table 1 . Table 2 in Appendix A presents the summary statistics for both equilibria. Note that in the symmetric information equilibrium, the job creation rate and destruction rate are simply given by η, 1.43 percent. This implies a job reallocation rate of 2.86 percent. However, with asymmetric information, the job creation and destruction rates are both 3.82 percent per year, implying an annual job reallocation rate of 7.64 percent. So the endogenous financing constraints lead to a job creation Davis et al. (1996) , where the ASM is exploited to document job creation and destruction facts, the mean annual job creation, destruction, and reallocation rates of U.S. manufacturing during the 1972-88 period are 9.1 percent, 10.3 percent, and 19.4 percent respectively. Therefore conditional on the model, 26.26 percent of job creation, 23.2 percent of job destruction and 24.64 percent of job reallocation observed in the data can be accounted for by the endogenous financing constraints due to informational frictions in the financial market. This result suggests that financial frictions could have significant impact on job reallocation. The model also generates a very high fraction of job creation by new firms (27.23%) and job destruction by exiting firms (54.06%), as shown in Table 2 . Although this result overestimates the contribution of new firms and exiting firms to job creation and destruction (due to the fact that the model matches employment shares of entrants and exiters while underestimates the magnitude of job creation and destruction), it makes clear that the contribution to job creation and destruction by entrants and exiters is much higher relative to their contribution to employment. This is consistent with the data. According to Davis et al. (1996) , a large fraction of job creation and destruction is accounted for by start-up plants (15 .5%) and shut-down plants (22.9%) despite their low employment shares.
Negative Size Dependence of the Turnover
As documented in empirical studies, the turnover of firms and jobs exhibits a negative dependence on firm size and age. In the model, there is both exogenous and endogenous turnover of firms and jobs. The exogenous turnover, by assumption, is independent of firm size and age. The endogenous turnover, driven by the endogenous financing constraints, is expected to be size or age dependent, as suggested by a linearly decreasing endogenous liquidation probability in firm equities. This subsection examines whether the overall turnover exhibits negative size or age dependence as in the data, and if so, how close the degree of dependence is to that observed in the data.
To explore these questions, we draw 100,000 firms from the stationary firm distribution over equity values, and simulate the model for 170 periods (10 simulations of 17 years). The simulation records the age and employment of every firm in every period. If a firm exits, its age is reset to 1, indicating the exit of the previous firm and the entry of a new firm. Then using each simulated sample (a 17-year panel of firms), relevant firm exit and job flow rates can be computed for every size and age category. Averages across the 10 simulations are reported in Table 3 -9 in Appendix A. Table 3 reports the 1-year, 2-year, 5-year, 10-year and 15-year exit rates for each firm size category, where Classification I gives a broad firm size classification and Classification II is a more detailed one. Firm size here refers to employment in the base year, i.e. the initial year of the time interval over which a particular exit rate is calculated. Table 3 displays a strong negative relationship between exit rates and the size of firms. For example, 70 percent of firms with employment less than 200 workers exit in 5 years, while only 7 percent of firms with employment above 700 workers exit in 5 years. In particular, the 10-year and 15-year exit rates are strictly decreasing as firm size increases. Table 3 also reports the percentage increase in the probability of survival over a 1-year, 2-year, 5-year, 10-year and 15-year period with a 1 percent increase in base year firm size. These numbers are obtained from a standard probit regression. 10 The survival probabilities clearly exhibit a strong 10 Following Evans (1987) , the regression is specified as E(survival|size) = Φ β 0 + β 1 log(size) + β 2 (log(size)) 2 . The effects of a 1 percent increase in firm size on survival probabilities are evaluated at the mean employment in base year. Evans (1987) also uses firm age and number of plants as additional regressors.
Exit Rates by Size
positive relationship with firm size. For example, a 1 percent increase in base year size leads to 39.3 percent increase in the probability of survival over a 5-year period.
Such negative size dependence of firm exit or positive dependence of firm survival is consistent with the qualitative features of firm turnover documented in recent empirical studies of the U.S. manufacturing. Evans (1987) , using a sample drawn from the Small Business Data Base (SBDB) for the period of 1976-80, finds that a 1 percent increase in initial firm size leads to a 6-7 percent increase in the probability of firm survival over the 5-year period. Dunne et al. (1989) and Davis et al. (1996) also document a strong negative relationship between the failure rates and size of plants, using plant-level LRD data. Due to the different data sets exploited, our results are not directly comparable to the quantitative results of these studies. Nevertheless, the quantitative model clearly captures the strong negative size dependence of firm exit exhibited in the data.
According to the model, the driving force underlying this negative size dependence is a negative relationship between liquidation probabilities and firm equity, and an overall positive relationship between firm equity and employment implied by the optimal financial contract.
Employment Flows by Size
Several related but distinct concepts of employer size have been adopted by empirical studies in computing job flow rates and classifying firms or plants. A traditional measure (see Dunne et al. (1989) and Evans (1987) ) is base-year employment. Using this measure, job creation rates for new firms are not well defined. Davis, et al. (1996) instead propose two new concepts for plant size: current plant size and average plant size. Despite different size concepts adopted, the empirical studies all find a negative size dependence of job flow rates. Following the definitions of Davis et al. (1996) , we define current firm size as the simple average of a firm's current employment and its employment 1 year ago and average firm size as the weighted mean annual employment over the life cycle of a firm. Our analysis considers the three concepts of firm size. Specifically, to explore the relationship between job flow rates and base year size, job flow rates are defined using base year employment and firms are classified by their base year employment.
11 To explore the relationship between job flow rates and current firm size or average firm size, job flow rates are defined using current firm size, and firms are classified by their cur-rent size or average size. 12 The latter is consistent with the practice in Davis et al. (1996) , although the production units considered there are plants rather than firms. Table 4 reports the correlation coefficients between gross job flow rates and firm size for the three size measures. Here is a brief description of how we calculate these correlations for the average firm size. Using a simulated sample-a 17-year panel of firms, the correlation coefficients between gross job flow rates and average firm size in year t, t = 2, . . ., 17, is obtained as follows. We first calculate the gross job flow rates from year t − 1 to year t (defined using current firm size) for every firm existing in year t. We then calculate every firm's average size as the weighted average employment during the firm's life span where the weight for employment in a particular year is the ratio of employment in that year relative to total employment of the firm during its life span. This gives us average firm sizes and corresponding job flow rates for all firms in year t. The correlations between job flow rates and average firm size in year t can then be easily obtained. Averages across the 16 years gives the correlations for this simulation, and averages across the 10 simulations are reported in Table 4 . Correlations for the other two size measures are obtained similarly.
Note that all correlations in Table 4 are significantly less than zero, implying a strong negative correlation between job flow rates and firm size. In particular, the correlation coefficients of job creation rates, job destructions rates and job reallocation rates (sum of creation rates and destruction rates) with average firm size are -0.4583, -0.3248 and -0.4001 respectively. These figures are not far from those exhibited in the ASM data, which are approximately -0.626, -0.5433 and -0.5882 respectively. 13 This result suggests that endogenous borrowing constraints may explain 73 percent of the negative size dependence for job creation, 60 percent for job destruction, and 68 percent for job reallocation.
To further explore the size dependence of gross employment flows, we also document the mean annual job flow rates and shares by firm size category. Table 5 reports the results for average firm size classification. Except for very small firms, job creation rates are monotonically decreasing with firm size. The weak positive relationship between job creation rates and firm size for small firms results from the non-monotonic labor policy function in low regions of equity values, as shown in Figure 1 . Job destruction and reallocation rates both exhibit a monotonically decreasing relationship with average firm size. These properties are consistent with the patterns shown in Table 4 .1 of Davis et al (1996) . In terms of net growth rates of employment, Table 5 does not show systematic correlation between them and average firm size, which is also consistent with Davis et al. (1996) . In terms of the magnitudes of job flow rates, a comparison of Table 5 and Table 4 .1 of Davis et al. (1996) shows that the model predicts higher job creation, destruction and reallocation rates than the data for small firms while lower job flow rates for large firms. This suggests that financing constraints, as the main driving force for firm dynamics in the model, have a more significant impact on small firms than on large firms. Consistent with the findings of Davis et al. (1996, Table 4 .3), medium and large firms account for a majority of job creation and destruction shares despite much lower job flow rates than small firms. Job flow rates by base-year size, shown in Table 6 , or current size categories exhibit very similar patterns as in Table 5 .
Growth Rates Conditional on Survival
There is a large body of empirical work that investigates the relationship between firm growth and size conditional on survival and generally finds that Gibrat's Law that firm growth is independent of firm size is rejected. For example, Evans (1987) , using a 5-year balanced panel from SBDB, finds that the growth rates and the variability of growth rates both decrease with firm size. Hall (1987) also finds a weak rejection of Gibrat's Law for smaller firms, using panel data on publicly traded U.S. manufacturing firms. The size concept commonly used in these studies is the baseyear size -employment in the initial year of the panel. It's clear from Table 6 that net growth rates, which take into account firm exit (growth rates for exiting firms are -1), have no systematic relationship with base-year firm size, though they seem to be weakly decreasing with firm size for medium and large firms.
We conduct the following exercise to examine the relationship between firm growth and base-year size conditional on survival. For every 5-year period in the simulated data sample, we construct a balanced panel of firms who have survived this 5-year period. Then we calculate the size, mean annual growth rate and the variability of growth over this 5-year period for every firm in the panel, where size is a firm's employment in the first year of the 5-year period, the mean annual growth rate is the average of the four annual growth rates, and the variability of growth (within a firm) is the standard deviation of the four annual growth rates. These definitions closely follow the definitions used by Evans (1987) . We then calculate the correlations between growth rates and firm size, classify firms into groups by size, and calculate average growth rates and variability of growth for each group. Table 7 in Appendix A reports the averages of these statistics across all 5-year panels. Table 7 clearly shows a strong negative size dependence of growth rate and variability of growth conditional on survival, suggesting that conditional on survival smaller firms grow faster while the growth is more volatile. This is qualitatively consistent with the empirical findings in, for example, Evans (1987) and Hall (1987) . Quantitatively, however, our results are not directly comparable to those studies, since different data-sets are exploited and regression-based procedures are applied there.
Exit Rates and Employment Flows by Age
The model also generates an unconditional negative age dependence of firm exit and job reallocation. Table 8 reports firm exit rates and Table 9 reports job flow rates by the age of firms. Clearly, firm exit rates, job creation rates, destruction rates and reallocation rates are all decreasing with firm age. However, the negative age dependence results from the negative size dependence and a generally positive relationship between firm size (employment) and age implied by the model. Older firms are typically larger and larger firms have lower exit rates and job reallocation rates, therefore older firms have lower exit rates and job reallocation rates. Once firm size is controlled, the negative age dependence disappears. Cooley and Quadrini (2001) extend the framework of Hopenhayn (1992) to incorporate exogenous financing constraints in one-period external finance and exogenous firm exit and show that the integration of persistent technology shocks and financial frictions allows the model to generate simultaneous negative size dependence (conditional on age) and negative age dependence (conditional on size) in the turnover of firms and jobs. Here, with endogenous financing constraints and firm exit arising from a long-term credit relationship and independent production shocks, the model is able to account for the negative size dependence but fails to generate negative age dependence conditional on size.
Other Quantitative Implications of the Model
The model also has other interesting implications of financial frictions. Table 2 presents a comparison between the equilibria with and without the informational friction in terms of firm size distribution, aggregate output, employment, and so on. First, with asymmetric information firm size ranges from 124 to 1,500 workers while all firms have identical size with symmetric information. As shown in Figure 2 , the distribution of firm size is quite skewed to the right, i.e., a majority of firms are large firms. In the data, small firms account for a large fraction of total number of firms and firm size distribution is also more dispersed. The model's prediction for firm size distribution can be improved by adding heterogeneity into the production technology. Second, the total number of firms is smaller under asymmetric information, while the average firm size is larger. In the model financing constraints relax as firms become larger, as a result, the equilibrium favors a smaller number of firms with larger size. This observation suggests that financial frictions may play a role in the determination of industry structure. Third, the presence of financial frictions could cause sizable losses in aggregate output (8.64 percent) and employment (2.35 percent). These results should be taken with caution since they hinge on a partial equilibrium analysis. Finally, financial frictions can largely shift the division of revenues between banks and firms. With asymmetric information, the total payments to the bank as a fraction of total revenues are much lower than under symmetric information (36.51 percent versus 96.28 percent) while the total dividends of firms are much higher (63.49 percent versus 3.72 percent of total revenues). The intuition is that with informational asymmetries the bank has to provide incentives for entrepreneurs to truthfully reveal their private information by giving relatively more to the entrepreneurs.
Alternative Models and Quantitative Results
For a robustness check of the important quantitative implications of the benchmark model, we calibrate two alternative models in this section. In one model, firms are financed by the limited commitment contract discussed in Li (2009) , and in the other, firms are financed by the impatient entrepreneur contract discussed there. Firms are not subject to stochastic exogenous exit in both models. Other elements of the two models are the same as the benchmark model. Properties of the two modified versions of the C-H contract imply that both models possess a stationary equilibrium with firm entry, exit and growth fully driven by endogenous financing constraints implied by the optimal lending contracts.
Here is a brief description of the two lending contracts. We refer to Li (2009) for a detailed formulation and characterization. This study discusses two ways to amend the C-H contract to change its long-run implications. In the first variation, the bank is assumed to have limited commitment in the sense that she will renege on the contract if the value of the contract to herself falls below some critical level B from any period onwards. In the second variation, it is assumed that the entrepreneur discounts future cash flows more heavily than the bank, with a discount factor β e < β . The optimal lending contract under either variation implies a non-degenerate stationary distribution of firm sizes (equity values), with borrowing constraints binding in the long run. Brief intuitions are as follows. For the C-H contract, it is optimal for the firm to "front load": to repay all revenues to the bank (and hence consume nothing) until the firm's equity grows to the unconstrained stage and, thereafter, make zero repayments in every period. The term "equity" represents the firm's claim to future cash flows that the investment project will deliver. It grows as the firm makes repayments to the bank, or in other words, as the firm puts deposits in the bank. If, however, the entrepreneur is impatient relative to the bank then the interest rate the firm earns on its deposits at the bank is lower than its time preference rate, so that the firm would not find it optimal to accumulate deposits to the level at which borrowing constraints cease to bind. The limited commitment assumption for the bank is equivalent to putting an upper bound on the firm's equity (the value of the contract to the firm), since the total value of the contract is bounded above by the maximum cash flows the project could yield. This suggests that the firm, fearing that the bank may renege, does not want to deposit too much at the bank. Both variations prevent the firm from accumulating equity to the unconstrained level implied by the C-H contract. As a result, borrowing constraints exist in the long run such that endogenous firm entry, exit and job reallocation exist in the stationary equilibrium of the alternative models.
Note that, in terms of parameterization, the three models only differ in one parameter: η for the benchmark model, B for the limited commitment model, and β e for the impatient entrepreneur model. So calibration of the two alternative models closely follow the calibration procedure described in Section 4.1. In particular, for the limited commitment model, B is calibrated jointly with γ, π, S and M to match the five moments: exit rate of U.S. manufacturing firms, employment shares of new and exiting firms, and relative sizes of new and exiting firms. For the impatient entrepreneur model, β e , γ, π, S and M are jointly calibrated to match the same five moments. Again, simulated annealing algorithm is applied to perform the moment-matching for both models. Table 10 in Appendix A reports the parameter values and matched moments for both models. Notably, calibrated values for common parameters are close to each other, and also not far from the calibrated values for the benchmark model. The impatient entrepreneur model matches the data quite well, while the limited commitment model over-estimates the relative sizes of new and exiting firms and hence their contributions to total employment. Figure 3 and 4 in Appendix A plot the stationary distributions of firm employment for both models, and Table 11 reports some summary statistics. Compared with the benchmark model, both models seem to yield a firm distribution that is more consistent with the data, with smaller firms account for a large fraction of to-tal firms. A notable difference between the two models is that large firms are much larger in the impatient entrepreneur model than in the limited commitment model, which leads to a larger average firm size in the impatient entrepreneur model. This may be due to two reasons. On the one hand, the limited commitment assumption puts an upper bound on value entitlements to firms, which restricts the scope of worker hiring financed by bank loans as borrowing constraints tend to relax as firm equity grows. On the other hand, a lower discount factor for entrepreneurs implies that entrepreneurs prefer higher consumption today, which has to be supported by higher employment to generate higher current revenues. This also explains why the relative sizes of new and exiting firms are larger in the limited commitment model, as shown in Table 10 , though their absolute sizes are close to the impatient entrepreneur model.
Finally, what do these alternative models say about the two quantitative questions we aim to address: the quantitative significance of job reallocation and the size dependence of job flow rates due to financial frictions? First note that the symmetric information version of each model implies a degenerate firm distribution without firm entry and exit and hence no job creation or destruction in a stationary industry equilibrium. As shown in Table 11 , the limited commitment model generates a 10.05 percent annual job creation or destruction rate, while this quantity is 11.2 percent in the impatient entrepreneur model. These values are close to the observed job creation and destruction rates in the data, and are much larger than those suggested by the benchmark model. No doubt these results over-estimate the contributions of financial frictions to job reallocation. In the benchmark model, an exogenous firm exit is introduced to avoid degeneracy, and it also serves to capture firm exit in the data that is due to forces other than financial frictions. In the two alternative models, firm exit is fully driven by financial frictions. Hence, calibrating both models to match the observed firm exit rate leads to an over-estimation of the contributions of financial frictions. Nevertheless, this result again confirms the quantitative significance of job reallocation due to financial frictions. In particular, the interaction of asymmetric information and limited commitment of banks, with the latter representing another form of financial frictions, leads to job reallocations that are more quantitatively significant than implied by asymmetric information alone. Job reallocations of a similar magnitude also result from the interaction of asymmetric information and impatient entrepreneurs, since the latter closely resemble the limited commitment assumption as discussed in Li (2009) . Table 12 and 13 report job flow rates by average firm size category and the correlations between job flow rates and average firm size for both models. Clearly, job creation, destruction, and reallocation rates all exhibit a decreasing relationship with average firm size. Compared with the benchmark model, this negative size dependence is stronger in both models, reflected in the more negative correlation coefficients of gross job flow rates with average firm size. In fact, the magnitudes of the correlation coefficients in both models are close to those exhibited in the data, suggesting that financial frictions, as the only driving force for job reallocations in both models, can well capture the negative size dependence of job reallocation. In the benchmark model, the negative size dependence is mitigated since job reallocations are also driven by exogenous firm exit which is size independent.
As characterized in Li (2009) , the limited commitment contract and impatient entrepreneur contract share very similar qualitative properties. This calibration exercise shows similarities as well as important differences in their quantitative implications for firm dynamics.
Final Remarks
This paper constructs and calibrates an industry equilibrium model, in which firm dynamics are driven by endogenous financing constraints arising from informational frictions, to explore the quantitative implications of financial frictions for job reallocation. We find that financial frictions can account for a significant amount of job reallocation and the negative size dependence of gross job flow rates. The model also has implications regarding firm exit rates, growth rates and the variability of growth that are consistent with empirical findings.
This study can be viewed as a first step toward a quantitative study of the impact of financial frictions on industry dynamics. It belongs to an emerging literature that incorporates endogenous financing constraints to quantitatively evaluate the aggregate consequences of financial frictions. For simplicity, the model abstracts from heterogeneity in technology across firms, capital accumulation, technological progress, and aggregate uncertainty, all of which are closely related to decisions at the firm level and hence aggregate dynamics. The model suggests that financial frictions also play a role in accounting for firm size distribution, industry structure, output growth, and so on. Each implication deserves further investigation. Notes: The numbers corresponding to 'survival probability with size' give the percentage changes in the probability of survival over a 1-year, 2-year, 5-year, 10-year or 15-year period with a 1 percent increase in firm size. Notes: "jcrate"," jdrate" and" jrrate" refer to job creation rate , job destruction rate and job job reallocation rate respectively. Notes: Since the base-year size for new entry firms is zero so that the job creation rates are not well defined, we exclude new entry firms when computing the job creation rate. 
APPENDIX B: Proofŝ
Proof of Lemma 1:
However, the fact that
To see the dependence of V 0 (p) on p, note that the periodic profit function π p f (l) − l is continuous and strictly increasing in p. SoŴ (V ; p), and hence W (V ; p) −V , is continuous and strictly increasing in p. Therefore V 0 (p) is continuous and strictly increasing in p as long as a solution to (P 3 ) exists at p.
Proof of Lemma 2:
Need to show that for an arbitrary real number κ > 0,
Since for every A ∈ V (p), µ t (A; p) = 0 implies (κµ t )(A; p) = 0, κµ t is absolutely continuous with respect to µ t . By Radon-Nikodym Theorem, d(κµ t ) = κdµ. So With p * given, policy functions l(V ; p * ), V H (V ; p * ), V L (V ; p * ), τ(V ; p * ), α(V ; p * ) and V c (V ; p * ) as well as value functions W(V; p * ) andŴ (V ; p * ) are uniquely determined by the contracting problems (P 1 ) and (P 2 ).
The final step is to establish the existence and uniqueness of an invariant measure µ * and a mass of entry E * that satisfy the equilibrium conditions. Let H(V, A; p) : [V r (p),Ṽ (p)] × V (p) → [0, 1] be the transition function for next period equity value V given current equity value V and output price p (suppose (P 3 ) has a solution at p such that V 0 (p)) is well defined). The function H is defined as follows by the policy functions:
Proof of Theorem 1:
For any given distribution of firms, µ, there exists a unique p that satisfies condition (ii) in the definition of equilibrium. Denote p 0 as the output price corresponding to µ = 0 (p 0 may be infinity). First we show that under some restrictions on I and M, there exists a unique 0 < p * < p 0 satisfying V 0 (p * ) = M (Condition (iii) in the definition). We show that the transition function H is monotone, has the Feller property, and satisfies the mixing condition of Assumption 12.1 of Stokey and Lucas (1989) .
• H is monotone: We need to show for any nondecreasing function g, the function T g is also nondecreasing, where T g is defined as (T g)(V ; p) =
• H has the Feller property: We need to show that for any bounded and continuous function g, the function T g is also bounded and continuous. Since H(V, ·; p) is a probability measure, ||T g|| ≤ ||g||. Hence T g is bounded.
To prove the continuity of T g, note from the definition of H(V,V ; p) that
The continuity of T g follows the continuity of the policy functions α, V c , V H and V L .
• H satisfies the the mixing condition: We need to show that there existsV ∈ [V r (p),Ṽ (p)], ε > 0 and N ≥ 1 such that H N (V r (p), [V ,Ṽ (p)]) ≥ ε and H N (Ṽ (p), [V r (p) ,V]) ≥ ε. This condition is obviously satisfied because the evolution process of equity values has no absorbing state due to the exogenous probability of exit (exiting firms are replaced with new ones with initial equity value V 0 (p)).
Let p = p * , E t ≡ 1 in Eq. (14), then by Theorem 12.12 of Stokey and Lucas (1989) , the operator T * has a unique fixed point µ, i.e., there exists a unique invariant distribution µ of equity values with ergodic set [V r (p * ),Ṽ (p * )], which is independent of the initial firm distribution. Since l(V ) > 0 for V > 0, the aggregate output Y (µ; p * ) > 0. Let E * be determined by Q * ≡ D −1 (p * ) = E * Y(µ; p * ). Since p * < p 0 , Q * > 0 such that E * > 0, i.e., there is positive entry and exit. By the linear homogeneity of T * , µ * = E * µ is the unique invariant firm distribution over equity values when entry is E * .
Since 1 − α(V H (V )), 1 − α(V L (V )), V c (V H (V )) and V c (V L (V )) are all nondecreasing with V , it's clear that in all three cases the distribution function for V conditional on a higher V puts higher mass on higher equity values. Therefore, the distribution conditional on V 1 first-oder dominates the distribution conditional on V 2 ≤ V 1 .
